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ABSTRACT 
Flow, the concept developed by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi over the last forty years or so 
(see Csikszentmihalyi 1975) has been invoked quite often with respect to the way players 
engage with digital games (e.g. Baron 2012; Cowley et al. 2008; Sweetser and Wyeth 
2005; Brathwaite & Schreiber, 2009; Fullerton, Swain, & Hoffman, 2008; Schell, 2008). 
However Kubey & Csikszentmihalyi (2002) argue that ‘video games’ are in fact likely to 
promote undesirable experiences of a kind Csikszentmihalyi refers to as ‘entropy’ or 
unstructured and unsatisfying life experiences. 
This presentation explores Csikszentmihalyi’s greater thesis and examines how a broader 
reading of Flow theory can potentially help us understand Flow like engagements beyond 
the simple mechanistic view of challenge and reward sometimes encountered in the 
literature. 
The main thrust of the argument made here is to explicitly introduce personally expressed 
cultural values into the conditions of Flow. By doing so we can then provide a value 
centric analysis and design approach, similar to that of Cockton’s (2004; 2012) proposal 
to include values into general software design. That is the very nature of challenges and 
rewards needs to be considered in order to investigate how overcoming or receiving such 
would be positively or negatively perceived by individuals from particular cultures 
holding particular values. 
Thus we hope that we have dealt with the apparent contradiction in using 
Csikszentmihalyi’s concept in the study of games despite his criticism of such, and have 
provided some indication of how we can deal with unspecified rewards and the 
differential perception and engagement with potentially equivalent challenges while still 
supporting the accepted thesis of Flow. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of optimal engagement known as ‘Flow’ 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1975; Csikszentmihalyi 1990) has been put forward on numerous 
occasions as a model of how players might find enjoyment with digital games (e.g. Baron 
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2012; Cowley et al. 2008; Sweetser and Wyeth 2005). However Csikszentmihalyi has 
argued, in a fairly recent article (Kubey & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002), that digital games are 
a passive addictive activity, akin to watching television (pleasurable but ‘bad’ flow) but 
then he has also used chess as an example of an enjoyable activity which might promote 
‘good’ flow. In many game design text books' examinations of Flow, the authors (e.g. 
Brathwaite & Schreiber, 2009; Fullerton, Swain, & Hoffman, 2008; Schell, 2008) provide 
a one page or less summary where the below quote is paraphrased and the nine conditions 
of Flow are quoted with no examination of the fine shadings of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Flow 
suggested by Csikszentmihalyi. Add to this evidence the observation that players do not 
necessarily positively value Flow experiences in games (Salisbury 2013) and given the 
apparent complex contradiction in Csikszentmihalyi’s interpretation of his own theory 
and the current focus on the feature like conditions of the experience alone, it seems 
necessary to examine this other side of Flow theory and the way that it is interpreted in 
terms of the value we place on different Flow experiences.  
We can take the perspective that Flow only describes a rare and special type of 
heightened engagement, and thus this presentation will explore if Flow is an appropriate 
model of engagement with videogames in general, rather than only as a special or optimal 
case; under which conditions Flow might be said to truly be present; and how we can 
solve the problem of what we will refer to as ‘bad Flow’, especially when concerned with 
the playing of videogames. 
Csikszentmihalyi describes the experience of Flow as:  
“...a sense that one’s skills are adequate to cope with the challenges at hand, in a goal 
directed, rule-bound action system that provides clear clues as to how well one is 
performing. Concentration is so intense that there is no attention left over to think about 
anything irrelevant, or to worry about problems. Self-consciousness disappears, and the 
sense of time becomes distorted. An activity that produces such experiences is so 
gratifying that people are willing to do it for its own sake, with little concern for what 
they will get out of it, even when it is difficult, or dangerous.” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 
p. 71) 
Given the above quote, the Flow concept seems to be a fair description of a type of 
experience many might occasionally have with digital games, however what is often left 
out of such a description and consequent explorations is an examination of the broader 
context of this experience. We might reasonably ask why this particular experience and 
not another experience which the individual might find equally challenging? Also, having 
experienced an event under these conditions do we expect the individual to then seek that 
experience again and again? Empirical work in the engagements players have with digital 
games (Salisbury, 2013) suggests that that opportunity for action is but one method of 
selecting amongst similar possible experiences; obviously the experience must be 
understood in the socio-cultural context in which it is encountered. Indeed the main thesis 
of Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) is that in order 
for an individual to lead a meaningful life filled with enjoyment (the satisfaction one 
finds from having surpassed one’s personal expectations), life goals should be 
intrinsically or autotellically striven for; that extrinsic reward stops being important to the 
performance and enjoyment of activities which are meaningful to the life of the 
individual. The research which lead to this exploration of how digital games might be 
said to relate to Flow showed how players who have found what might be described as 
Flow in playing a game or games, report having found that experience deleterious; 
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pointless; a “waste of time”. These observations suggest that it is not always easy to 
separate intrinsically rewarding, self-motivating, autotelic activities from extrinsically 
rewarded, externally driven, exotelic activities. We must ask the question: is such a divide 
between intrinsically motivated and extrinsically motivated behaviours valuable, and 
ultimately do digital games provide opportunity for Flow in the manner apparently 
intended by Csikszentmihalyi? 
Interestingly Csikszentmihalyi has argued, in a relatively recent article (Kubey & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2002), that digital games are a passive, addictive activity akin to 
watching television, rather than a meaningful mode of true enjoyment. In order to unpack 
this position and explore how digital games can be so well aligned with the often quoted 
conditions of Flow, but be seen as destructive, the first section of this presentation will 
revisit Csikszentmihalyi’s various writings on the concept of Flow while taking into 
account some empirical observations gained in interview with individuals who reject the 
digital game play experience (despite, in some cases, reporting past experiences we might 
suppose to have been Flow-like) and whether the nine conditions of Flow 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996) are sufficient to give us an accurate picture of positive 
engagements with games. 
Csikszentmihalyi himself seems to argue for both good (positively valued and 
constructive) and bad (entropy inducing) Flow engagements, and places the difference 
between them within the space of the individual’s learned value system 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 34). 
So in order for Flow to be a truly useful concept within the study and successful 
development of engaging digital games, we argue that such concepts as Cultural Value 
(Bourdieu, 1986), Experience (Dewey, 1934) or Habitus (especially as expressed by 
Bourdieu, 1990) as well as a sense of culturally relative self sense (Cooley, 1902) should 
be included in order to place Flow in a broader context. That is while we may accept that 
Flow is the optimum in a scale of engagement, we might be able to arrive at a broader 
understanding of pre-Flow and sub-Flow engagements, and the conditions of engagement 
in general. The second part of this presentation will explore some of these concepts and 
how they might help us understand how people engage with digital games. 
That is we are not intending to argue against Csikszentmihalyi’s thesis, but are rather 
arguing that Flow is a special state of optimal experience and presents a somewhat deeper 
reading of the Flow literature than the simple matching of skill to challenge, which we 
hope will help to contextualise why Csikszentmihalyi seems to argue that engagement in 
Chess is an enlightening and transformative activity, while engagement in say Tetris 
might be said to be entropy inducing. 
CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW AND DIGITAL GAMES 
“Although much less research has been done on video games and computer use, the same 
principles often apply [as they might to television]. The games offer escape and 
distraction; players quickly learn that they feel better when playing; and so a kind of 
reinforcement loop develops. The obvious difference from television, however, is the 
interactivity. Many video and computer games minutely increase in difficulty along with 
the increasing ability of the player. One can search for months to find another tennis or 
chess player of comparable ability, but programmed games can immediately provide a 
near-perfect match of challenge to skill. They offer the psychic pleasure--what one of us 
(Csikszentmihalyi) has called "flow"--that accompanies increased mastery of most any 
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human endeavour. On the other hand, prolonged activation of the orienting response can 
wear players out. Kids report feeling tired, dizzy and nauseated after long sessions.” 
(Kubey & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002) 
 
The above quote, especially the value laden words used, such as ‘escape’ and 
‘distraction’, show that despite the admission that games may offer ‘flow’, in the case of 
‘video games’ the authors feel that the flow found in that specific context is undesirable. 
For Csikszentmihalyi Flow is the state of affairs where a person gains primarily intrinsic 
rewards from an activity; they are not doing it for money or fame, or often even because 
they know there is a well defined end product. Rather the activity in and of itself is the 
motivator, it is an ‘autotelic’ activity.  
 
“An activity was assumed to be autotelic (from the Greek auto = self and telos = goal, 
purpose) if it required formal and extensive energy output on the part of the actor, yet 
provided few if any conventional rewards.” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, p. 10) 
 
In order to understand what this claim about autotelism and video games could be we 
should explore what the basic conditions of Flow are. 
 
Creativity: Flow and the psychology of discovery and invention (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996) 
sets out a list of nine conditions of a flow experience: 
1. There are clear goals every step of the way 
2. There is immediate feedback to one’s actions 
3. There is a balance between challenges and skills 
4. Action and awareness are merged 
5. Distractions are excluded from consciousness 
6. There is no worry of failure 
7. Self-consciousness disappears 
8. The sense of time becomes distorted 
9. The activity becomes autotelic 
 
Given these nine conditions we can probably all remember instances of game-play 
(particularly in playing action games perhaps) where each of these conditions were met 
simultaneously. We might have been deep into a middle level of a favourite scrolling 
shoot-em-up where: 
1. We knew that what we had to do was avoid or shoot an onslaught of enemies 
2. We knew what weapons we had to use and how close those enemies were getting 
to destroying our ship 
3. We were at the point where we could just think fast enough and respond fast 
enough to avoid the stream of bullets and enemies  
4. We’d stopped thinking about what the controls were, and were just thinking in 
terms of move and shoot    
5. Nothing outside the game mattered for a few minutes, the birds singing outside, 
the fact that we might be a tad hungry or in need of the toilet. 
6. This is the furthest we’d ever come through this bullet hell, we just need to stay 
focussed to see the boss who must be only a little bit further. 
7. That we were sat cross legged in the kids’ playroom, on the spare television, in 
our pants didn’t enter our conscious mind even for an instant; we were our ship 
and the ship was us. 
The dozen or so tries to get past this one section seemed to have taken 5 minutes or so, 
but when we looked at the clock it took more like 45. Why we were flying through space 
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shooting baddies from another galaxy was because... well for the period where we were... 
because it was fun. There was no expectation of economic or social reward, it was 
pleasurable or enjoyable in its own right. It was enjoyable because of, rather than in spite 
of the energy we had invested in it. In having such an experience we could be described 
as having had a Flow experience, and it is this apparent match between what 
Csikszentmihalyi has published about the conditions of Flow and the subjective 
experience occasionally felt in playing which has apparently resulted in the use of Flow 
as a way of understanding engagement with games.  
However Csikszentmihalyi’s final clause, that for the individual the activity becomes 
autotelic, requires further consideration. What is a reward, conventional or otherwise? 
Are experiences rewarding even in the absence of possibly gaining money, fame, or other 
benefits incidental to the activity at hand? 
 
We might argue that autotelic experiences are moments where we feel rewarded by our 
own internal mechanisms not by any immediate or future external source. 
 
“An autotelic activity is one we do for its own sake because to experience it is the main 
goal. …Applied to personality, autotelic denotes an individual who generally does things 
for their own sake, rather than in order to achieve some later external goal" 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, p. 117). 
 
Was it the potentially extrinsic rewards offered by the game that kept us playing? The 
plink and plash of pixels of an enemy exploding, the wak-wak and strobing background 
of passing a sub-stage marker; the orienting response supposed by Csikszentmihalyi? 
Games are filled with simple immediate goals and apparent rewards that make it hard to 
perceive autotelic behaviour.  
 
However there is an apparent complication, as the desire to progress in a game is 
sometimes couched as a type of effort/reward structure which uncritically assumes that 
the completion of objectives to gain points, in game credits, some other tokens, or other 
structural in game ‘rewards’ is just that, an exotelic reward with the same value to the 
player as Csikszentmihalyi might claim money or acclaim could be (Loftus & Loftus, 
1983). 
 
Can games (even Chess) given their reliance on structured goals and endogenous rewards 
ever produce autotelic experiences? The way the literature on Flow talks about autotelic 
experiences would suggest that for Csikszentmihalyi this question of reward is not simply 
resolved by looking at the pleasure found in an activity, including supposed rewards.: 
 
“In our studies, we found that every flow activity, whether it involved competition, 
chance, or any other dimension of experience, had this in common: It provided a sense of 
discovery, a creative feeling of transporting the person into a new reality. It pushed the 
person to higher levels of performance, and led to previously undreamed of states of 
consciousness. In short it transformed the self by making it more complex. In this growth 
of the self lies the key to flow activities.” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, p. 74) 
 
So are we saying that in getting half a level further or getting a new high score in our 
shoot-em-up example we would have ‘transformed the self’? Did we enter ‘undreamed of 
states of consciousnesses? Does this statement amount to a tenth condition of Flow? Is 
there in fact something about autotelism which isn’t to simply find any activity which 
soaks up out attention? Maybe, and indeed Csikszentmihalyi later states: 
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“But this also depends on what activity provides flow. Unfortunately, many people find 
the only challenges they can respond to are violence, gambling, random sex, or drugs. 
Some of these experiences can be enjoyable, but these episodes of flow do not add up to a 
sense of satisfaction and happiness over time. Pleasure does not lead to creativity, but 
soon turns into addiction – the thrall of entropy.” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, pp. 123–124) 
 
This above quote suggests that there are two kinds of Flow, ‘good Flow’ (the kind that 
positively transforms the self) and ‘bad Flow’ (the kind that results in addiction and 
psychic entropy), but what is the difference? Returning again to Creativity (1996) where 
Csikszentmihalyi  discusses how society has a role in teaching young people what 
activities they should be enjoying in order to grow personally and culturally: 
 
“We are much too sophisticated in this day and age to have strong feelings in the matter. 
Yet we probably agree that we would feel better if our children learned to enjoy 
cooperation rather than violence; reading rather than stealing; chess rather than dice; 
hiking rather than watching television. In other words, no matter how relativistic and 
tolerant we have become, we still have priorities.” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, pp. 124–
125) 
 
Throughout his work Csikszentmihalyi seems to be arguing that while the principle 
experience of Flow is apparent in all societies, the activities through which one might 
achieve enjoyment or ‘good flow’ rather than mere pleasure or ‘bad flow’ are personally 
realised and have a relationship with culture if not society. That, once a person is 
experiencing Flow, they will not question the experience, and will continue to engage as 
long as the appropriate conditions are in place, is not the subject of this discussion. Rather 
it seems that Csikszentmihalyi is consistently arguing for an extra-Flow clause or a super 
condition of Flow which gives the individual a means of evaluating the meaning (and we 
would thus contend also value) of a given Flow inducing activity.  
What we seem to need is a wrapper which we can place around flow experiences which 
sets a person up to try an activity, and to subsequently question the merits of the 
activity once participated in. Without this wrapper we have no way of determining 
why Csikszentmihalyi seems to be arguing that chess players, exhausted from 
tournament play (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, p. 68) are positively transforming 
themselves, while video game players feeling tired after playing are having a 
negative experience due to ‘prolonged activation of the orienting response’ (r.e. The 
quote about video games provided above). 
 
 
DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN GOOD FLOW AND BAD FLOW 
A word that Csikszentmihalyi includes only occasionally in his presentation of Flow 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990)  is ‘value’. Such downplaying of the term might be due to his 
nervousness in  suggesting that if an activity has a value then it might be argued that that 
activity is being extrinsically rewarded and thus not necessarily autotelic, that the person 
is doing the thing for what value they can get out of it, not simply for its own sake. While 
Csikszentmihalyi admits that some Flow activities start with extrinsic rewards (e.g. 
surgeons get paid to perform surgeries), he argues that people sometimes find that they 
end up doing the activity for its own sake once and subsequent to their having achieved 
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Flow. He regularly uses the examples of money and fame to illustrate extrinsic rewards, 
and in the sense that people engaged in Flow activities might well not be seeking fame 
nor fortune this characterisation may well be correct. However are there other sources of 
value which are not so directly extrinsic or obviously exotelic? 
In his various works Csikszentmihalyi stresses that for Flow to be a positive force in 
someone’s life it should be found in activities which have meaning to that person’s life 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 1996). So where he talks of goals and growth he often refers to 
overall, global goals and growth in some personally meaningful direction, not just those 
encountered in isolated experiences. So an individual, in order to be happy should seek 
flow in activities which have both intrinsic reward and promote growth towards 
meaningful life ends. This merging of intrinsic local goals with intrinsic global goals into 
a single motivating structure, while simultaneously denying that striving for socially 
derived goals will lead to personal meaning, seems to work against the insistence that 
chess is good but video games are bad, as surely digital games might be meaningful to an 
individual just as Chess is to others. That is unless we allow for a kind of subjective sense 
of social acceptability, and thus personal/cultural value between different activities. It is 
our feeling that the difference between the chess player and the Tetris player is that the 
former is allowed to feel that what they are striving for has some significance to the wider 
world, and is thus development as a chess player is a worthy or valuable ambition, 
whereas the latter has no significance to the wider world so players do not feel that it is 
worthwhile or valuable. It seems obvious to us that, while Chess has a combinatorial 
complexity beyond that of Tetris, hence it’s endurance as a pastime thorough the ages, the 
players of Chess do not produce or engage in anything fundamentally more valuable than 
the players of Tetris. Surely a new way of looking at Chess (a new set of openings say) 
has as much utility to a person’s growth as a new way of looking at Tetris (a new well 
position or way of holding the controller say).    
So how do we account for the difference in value while still allowing for 
Csikszentmihalyi’s condition of autotelism? If we consider theories of value such as 
Bourdieu’s 3 forms of capital (1986), it seems that Csikszentmihalyi might be falling foul 
of the social control structures he himself argues against (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), by 
promoting activities with greater cultural capital (knowledge and values which have the 
possibility to be transformed into economic or social capital). If money (wages or prizes) 
equates to Economic Capital, and fame (the adulation of friends, colleagues, or even 
strangers) equates to a form of Social Capital, it seems that Csikszentmihalyi might be 
downplaying the possibility that people engage in certain activities for the acquisition of 
embodied Cultural Capital (knowledge, skill, values) with no plan to convert them to 
other forms of capital? It seems possible that in the absence of economic or social 
rewards an individual could be engaged in an activity because it transforms them in a 
socially agreeable way, or it has legitimacy within the social context of the activity with 
no promise of a social return on that investment in cultural capital. 
So is a good Flow activity one which promises to gain the actor enhanced, socially 
legitimated (Bourdieu, 1984) Cultural Capital whereas a bad Flow activity holds no such 
promise? Does a competent tournament Chess player spend a great deal of time 
accumulating Cultural Capital (knowledge, skill, and potential anecdotes say) in a well-
established and thoroughly legitimated ‘art’ whereas a competent tournament Tetris 
player (Cornelius, 2011) earns unconvertible capital in a relatively modern and 
unconventional pastime? Without delving into class violence through the legitimation of 
bourgeois tastes at the expense of middle to lower class tastes, we might accept the above 
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description of socially sanctioned or legitimated activities versus socially demonised 
activities as a way of differentiating ‘good Flow’ and ‘bad Flow’ in the way that 
Csikszentmihalyi has done in his critique of digital gaming. However, if we allow for 
socio-cultural legitimation in this way it seems that we are arguing for a tenth condition 
of Flow which is a social pressure to conform; surely an extrinsically motivating force 
which will break the ninth condition of autotelism. Chess is held by society to be good, so 
society will look favourably on chess players as clever and productive, whereas Tetris is 
held by society to be bad, so society will look unfavourably on Tetris players as dullards 
and time wasters, and thus in order to engage in ‘good Flow’ one must find personal 
value in socially legitimated activities which lead to the accumulation of Cultural Capital. 
This is not Csikszentmihalyi’s thesis, as in suggesting this adjustment to Flow to account 
for ‘bad Flow’ it seems that we have introduced an extrinsic motivator. However, 
returning to Csikszentmihalyi’s writing (especially 1990, 1996) we can see that he spends 
a great deal of time making the merits of an activity a subjective response. He argues that 
content and happy individuals are often in possession of an ‘autotelic personality’. That is 
a personality which allows the person to do things for their own sake and not for 
Economic or Social goals. Csikszentmihalyi argues that if one is in possession of such a 
personality then mundane, day to day survival can result in a Flow experience as all such 
activities can be subsumed into a greater life goal which is the advancement and growth 
of the self. As such the autotelic individual enjoys life, as everything they do (from 
washing the dishes to composing a sonata) becomes part of one unified challenge with all 
the conditions of a Flow experience listed above. 
Csikszentmihalyi regularly tries to draw a distinction between pleasurable and enjoyable 
experiences. Pleasurable experiences, for Csikszentmihalyi, are those experiences which 
draw an immediate sense of pleasure from the participating individual, but have no 
greater meaning to the individual (we would argue that they have no ‘value’ for the 
individual). Whereas enjoyable experiences are not necessarily immediately pleasurable 
(in fact they might be painful), but may allow the participant to feel a sense of satisfaction 
in successful participation (we would argue that the individual feels that the activity was 
worthwhile or valuable). These distinctions can be mapped to Tiger’s four pleasure model 
(Tiger, 1992), with Csikszentmihalyi’s pleasure equating to physio-pleasure (and maybe 
some aspects of socio-pleasure), while his enjoyment are aligned with psycho-pleasure 
and ideo-pleasure. We suggest that the distinction is one where personal socio-cultural 
value can be easily placed in ideo and psycho pleasures, but is more difficult to identify 
in psysio- pleasures, where there is no other value other than that the activity feels good. 
It seems that the difference for Csikszentmihalyi is one of life goals. Does the activity get 
you closer to where you want to be in life? Does the activity help you to self-actualise? 
Essentially this is an argument against a simplified interpretation of Utilitarianism 
(Bentham, 1789), where pleasure itself is not the most critical motivator for human 
activity. 
Thus Csikszentmihalyi’s broad argument seems to be that if the player of a game is 
overcoming a challenge in the game the difference between their striving to overcome 
that challenge being simply pleasurable but not necessarily enjoyable is whether this 
challenge is helping them tackle the greater challenges they have set for themselves in 
their life? If so then in overcoming that challenge then they will experience enjoyment; 
satisfaction in a job well done, a valuable step up. If not then they will experience 
‘entropy’ or the sense that they are wasting time on pointless pursuits; investing their 
time in activities with no value. 
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AN ARGUMENT FOR CULTURALLY SIGNIFICANT AUTOTELIC FLOW 
We propose that there is a way of tying the concepts of Flow and socio-cultural value 
together without forcing Flow into extrinsic motivation drawn from direct social or 
economic pressures such as fame or money. Intrinsic interest can lead to repeatable 
autotelic Flow experiences while under the guidance of received values by applying the 
following two arguments.  
The first argument is to consider culture as an entity which is not satisfactorily accounted 
for in only social or only subjective terms, rather it is the interaction between an 
individual and their ongoing social engagements (i.e. Mead, 1934 and subsequent 
“Symbolic Interactionist” approaches). So rather than asking what value a society places 
on an artefact or activity, or what advantage an individual gains by interacting with an 
artefact or engaging in an activity, we should be looking at how value is inculcated into 
an individual by way of their interaction with society. 
So we can question the significance or value of an artefact or activity (in our case any 
digital game play experience), in terms of how it is perceived by an individual with a 
specific, subjective personal socio-cultural background in a certain social context. Just 
looking at what demands a society makes of its members or how an individual might 
instrumentally seek specific rewards is then transformed into the study of how people 
learn to become successful members of their social contexts and having so learned to be 
such how those values shape their behaviour.    
Drawing naturally from this first argument the second argument is to suggest that 
individuals do not passively receive or respond to their immediate social context. Rather, 
over time, the values and norms positively encountered by the individual are inculcated or 
assimilated into the self to form a habitus (Bourdieu, 1986) or self-identity (Mead, 1934). 
That is, as soon as an individual is exposed to social situations at an early age they are 
learning successful tacit strategies to become a ‘successful’ member of that society. As 
such they are ‘becoming’ a particular kind of person, with particular knowledge and 
values; they are enculturated without conscious effort and this self-culture might be said 
to form a specific, relatively unique, embodied identity. 
So the difference between enjoyable ‘good Flow’ and mere ‘bad Flow’ is the difference 
between what is culturally acceptable and what is not, between whether a socially 
constructed self, embodying the values they have inculcated in interaction with social 
agents and institutions up to this point, would value the activity or not. Does the game 
present a meaningful activity with significance to the individual? While there has been 
significant interest in game-cultures as a distinct community of interest (For a critique of 
this approach see Shaw, 2010) we should not assume that mainstream culture is absent 
from the appreciation and evaluation of games. Games evidently present meanings and 
thus values within themselves, not just in the fictions they often represent, but in the 
actions the player is asked to perform (Bogost, 2007). So a player, embodying values, 
must find compatible value in the ludosis and semiosis presented by the game in order to 
engage in it. 
This cultural engagement can still be said to be autotelic, the player is not looking to 
external, social sources to motivate them to participate (and potentially find Flow). 
Instead they embody the culture and thus values that allow unconscious differentiation 
and evaluation of different activities. The individual is then acting in an autotelic manner, 
but part of the autotelic response is mediated by the aspects of the individual which 
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account for who they are and what they value, which is socially derived. 
So returning to Csikszentmihalyi’s portrayal of Chess as good and ‘video games’ as bad 
we could make the following argument:  
 Csikszentmihalyi finds no value in videogames  
o He wasn’t raised with them 
o His friends probably don’t play them 
o Presumably he does not see players producing anything tangible let alone 
useful 
o To him they look like a wasteful pastime like watching television 
(though surely the presentation of television as a wasteful activity 
depends on what television programmes are being watched) 
o Presumably he hasn’t played one and felt purposefully engaged by it 
 He can see a value in Chess because: 
o It has a very long and well-connected history as a game 
o He has personally interviewed many Chess players who presumably 
proselytised the benefits of playing  
o It might seem to him that Chess enhances the ability to think and focus 
o He might well have played Chess and in doing so might have felt 
engaged by it 
o Ultimately becoming a competent chess player seems a culturally 
acceptable or even desirable goal 
Accepting that in knowing little about Csikszentmihalyi’s personal history we have had 
to almost caricaturise his position we are trying to illustrate how a conception of good 
Flow vs bad Flow might occur as a subjective, culturally framed perspective. 
We argue then, that in order for Csikszentmihalyi’s assertion that Flow is an enriching, 
valuable, and enjoyable state we must include a tenth condition of Flow in order to 
militate against the possibility of also describing bad Flow, which the nine conditions of 
flow surely allow. We would suggest: 
10. Presents opportunity for progress or growth in a culturally significant direction 
Having this condition we can argue that a ‘hardcore gamer’ striving to complete a game 
on the hardest difficulty setting is developing a skill which is culturally significant to 
themselves. They are not just doing it for bragging rights, they are doing it because they 
are a ‘gamer’ and that’s what they do. They are developing skill and overcoming 
progressively more difficult pre-defined challenges in the same manner as rock climbers 
who scale specifically rated climbs. They are doing it for the personal satisfaction of a 
challenge overcome. It is only in the selection and reflection phase of an activity and in 
the minds of observers that questions such as “”Am I doing well?” “What am I doing 
here?” “Should I be doing this?”” (from Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, p. 38) are asked. During 
the Flow activity such questions are not asked, but just as the condition for the activity to 
become autotelic presents a condition outside of the ego-free Flow sensation, so too does 
the proposed condition of personal, cultural value. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND DESIGN 
In terms of pure ‘good Flow’ it is difficult to see where design interventions might 
encourage it in a game or other activity. That is in Csikszentmihalyi’s conception of Flow 
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it seems that one of the greatest conditions is an individual’s receptiveness to eschew 
social controls and approach activities from an autotelic position. That is it is the 
individual who is autotelic (capable of acting without external drivers) rather than the 
activity. Csikszentmihalyi presents examples of individuals who approach every day 
activities with autotelic intent (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990); essentially gamifying their 
everyday experiences. However he also presents the nine conditions of Flow listed above, 
so there is at least some sense that an individual needs to find themselves in an activity 
with the appropriate features or conditions, even if some of those conditions are self-
imposed. 
We argue that in including the sense of cultural significance, which accounts for both 
social and individual values, it is reasonable to suggest that any activity which is valued 
by the participating individual has more chance of providing a Flow experience than one 
which is not individually culturally valued.   
So the question of design for the proposed tenth condition of Flow is one about designing 
for personalised cultural or axiological value. Outside of digital games design there are 
some who argue that designing for value (after considering systems design, ergonomic 
design, and experience design) is the next phase in software design (e.g. Cockton, 2004). 
It is conceivable that much of the industry of games design and thus games design 
practice will continue to take a fairly mechanistic approach to the design of games for 
short-term, monetary returns. However we could suggest that if games designers are 
striving for greater recognition of their products as culturally significant objects, and 
there is a will for games to avoid being seen as a destructive, time wasting merely 
pleasurable pastimes, then the values embodied in games needs to be addressed as part of 
the design practice. More than the sense that games designers are striving for a 
recognition of legitimacy for their products though, it seems obvious that games which 
address the cultural values of enough players are more likely to be successful than those 
which only address the values of a niche.  
There is a tradition of looking at human activity as structured into hierarchies of need 
(e.g. Maslow, 1954) and it has been suggested that summed sub-goals are valued 
according to the way in which they might contribute to super-goals, the pinnacle of which 
is self-actualisation (for example consider the approach taken by Carver & Scheier, 
2001). It seems to be this process within which Csikszentmihalyi places Flow as 
enjoyment (or the variant of Flow I have dubbed ‘good Flow’). It is acceptable to strive to 
become the best chess player, rock climber, scientist, production line worker, dancer, or 
surgeon one can be, and pushing oneself to achieve ever greater things in these domains 
can produce Flow, which is good. However it is not acceptable (at least not for many) to 
become the best Tetris, Call of Duty, League of Legends, World of Warcraft, or generic 
videogame player one can be, and these activities may also yield Flow experiences for 
committed players, but that is bad or ‘bad Flow’. 
The question of design for value then becomes the question of whose values you are 
trying to align your design with. Committed ‘gamers’ might find that their interest in 
trying to master the nuances of a first-person shooter, despite social pressures to do 
something more ‘useful’ to be very Flow inducing, and for them ‘good’ Flow inducing as 
they never see the activity as a ‘waste’ of time. Indeed the cultural capital they develop as 
they develop the skills and knowledge to take on increasingly difficult challenges and 
opponents might allow them to convert some of that capital into other forms at some 
point in the future. They might enter a game sub-culture and gain social capital from the 
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experience, or they might enter tournaments and win economic capital. They might use 
the knowledge, skills, and passion they have developed to join the industry in producing 
similar games for others or critiquing games for a return on their investment of time and 
energy. However the development of capital by hardcore players does not help us 
understand what values players who are less self-identified as ‘gamers’ will allow them to 
achieve good Flow rather than bad. Maybe if we look at how different genres are 
considered in other media we might see some parallels. How does art cinema differentiate 
itself from blockbuster cinema (and not just in the box-office receipts)? How do the 
various musical art forms differentiate themselves from pop music? What elevates 
literature from genre fiction? Whatever answer you might settle upon I would wager that 
it comes down to that the former always do something which is more culturally valued 
than the latter, not that they make more money or have more fans, but that they express 
things that people think is important to express.  
Another lens through which it might be possible to explore these valueful decisions is to 
assume that individuals implicitly evaluate the suitability of their own actions as if they 
were evaluating the actions of others. Cooley’s ‘Looking Glass Self’ (Cooley, 1902) is 
such a model which assumes that individuals are asking themselves if such and such an 
activity is ‘good’ by applying the same judgement criteria on their own behaviour that 
they might apply on the behaviours of others. If someone (with my embodied system of 
values) saw me doing this, what would they think of me? Am I the kind of person who 
would or even should be doing this? So as one designs for value, the context of the 
activity and the implied values that context expresses become a critical question in the 
enjoyment of the activity. 
So to design for good Flow I would suggest that using the Value centric design methods 
of Cockton and the procedural rhetoric structures of Bogost (2007) might well help to 
create games with sufficient meaning to militate against the possibility that players will 
feel that they are wasting their time, or looking like they are wasting their time (to 
themselves), despite engaging in an ostensibly Flow experience. 
CONCLUSION 
Flow as a mechanistic concept maps very clearly onto fairly common game experiences. 
The combination of good feedback, clear goals, variable difficulty levels and such are 
clearly an expression of at least 8 of the 9 basic conditions of Flow.  
However, Csikszentmihalyi’s broader thesis is not to explain the pleasure of overcoming 
challenges, but is rather an exploration of the enjoyment found in overcoming worthwhile 
challenges, and so in order to design for worthwhile or ‘good’ Flow we propose that 
Csikszentmihalyi’s broader thesis be taken into account. The simplest way to achieve this 
shift in emphasis is to add an extra condition to the list of nine conditions of Flow 
proposed by Csikszentmihalyi in his book on Creativity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). The 
extra condition proposed suggests that the embodied cultural values of participants be 
taken into account to mitigate against the possibility of inducing hollow, worthless, ‘bad’ 
Flow for players of digital games. A side effect of this addition is that experiences which 
might not yield the all the conditions of optimal state described by Flow theory might 
laso be accounted for (if someone values something they don’t have to be ‘in the zone’ to 
keep at it). 
How these values might be included in the practice of design for digital games (or even 
games in general) is difficult to express in a simple set of guidelines or heuristics, but it is 
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proposed that cues be taken from the movement toward design for values and worth 
which has been expressed in general software design (Cockton, 2004, 2012). 
Essentially the position of this presentation is that while the basic conditions of Flow, as 
applied by various designers and authors to date, is a good model of heightened, 
‘pleasurable’ engagements, in order to design toward repeatable, valued, ‘enjoyable’ 
engagements Csikszentmihalyi’s broader thesis needs to be considered.
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